Monday
22.10.2018
14:00 Uhr
SFB Seminar SeriesPublic
Sequential Majoritarian Blotto Games by Tilman Klumpp and Kai A. Konrad
Location
B6, 30-32 - Room 310
Date
start: 22.10.2018 - 14:00 Uhr
end: 22.10.2018 - 15:00 Uhr

Speaker:
Kai Konrad - Max-Planck-Institut München
Abstract:
We study Colonel Blotto games with sequential battles and a majoritarian objective. For a large class of contest success functions, the equilibrium is unique and characterized by an even split: Each battle that is reached before one of the players wins a majority of battles is allocated the same amount of resources from the player’soverall budget. As a consequence, a player’s chance of winning any particular battle is independent of the battlefield and of the number of victories and losses the player accumulated in prior battles. This result is in stark contrast to equilibrium behavior in sequential contests that do not involve either fixed budgets or a majoritarian objective. We also consider the equilibrium choice of an overall budget. For many contest success functions, if the sequence of battles is long enough the payoff structure in this extended games resembles an all-pay auction without noise.Keywords: Blotto games; dynamic battles; multi-battle contest; all-pay auctions; sequential elections.JEL codes: D72; D74.

Monday
05.11.2018
14:00 Uhr
SFB Seminar SeriesPublic
The Political Economy of Medicaid: Ideology, Eligibility, and the Consequences of Cost-Saving Measures
Location
B6, 30-32 - Room 310
Date
start: 05.11.2018 - 14:00 Uhr
end: 05.11.2018 - 15:00 Uhr

Speaker:
Claire S.H. Lim - Queen Mary University of London
Abstract:
We explore the linkages between government ideology in U.S. states and geographic variation in Medicaid program design and operations. Medicaid eligibility criteria tend to be more generous in liberal states. Simultaneously, fee-for-service reimbursement rates for physician services have been notably lower in liberal states. These two patterns lead to the following question: to what extent does the partisan composition of the government drive eligibility and reimbursement over time? If cost-saving measures accompany eligibility expansion, then whatare their consequences for resource allocation? We explore long-run linkages among partisan composition of the government, eligibility, cost-saving measures, and expenditures for theMedicaid expansion from the mid-1990s to 2010.Our analysis consists of four steps. First, we analyze how much the partisan composition of the state government drives eligibility expansion. Second, we explore the tradeoff between breadth of eligibility and fee-for-service reimbursement rates. Third, we investigate driving forces behind the evolution of the delivery systems, i.e., Medicaid managed care diffusion.Fourth, we analyze the resulting patterns of per-enrollee spending.We find that the partisan composition of the state house played a critical role in the relatively later stage of eligibility expansion and the reduction of fee-for-service reimbursement rates over time. While the HMO penetration in the private insurance market drove the Medicaid managed care diffusion, the diffusion also tends to go hand in hand with the reduction of fee-for-service reimbursement rates. Finally, Medicaid per-enrollee spending increased substantially over time despite the adoption of cost-saving measures. This unintended consequence was due to the systematic changes in HMO practices that coincided with the eligibility expansion.

Monday
19.11.2018
14:00 Uhr
SFB Seminar SeriesPublic
tba
Location
B6, 30-32 - Room 310
Date
start: 19.11.2018 - 14:00 Uhr
end: 19.11.2018 - 15:00 Uhr

Speaker:
David Doyle - University of Oxford
Abstract:
tba

Monday
26.11.2018
14:00 Uhr
Seminar SeriesPublic
Audits for Accountability: Evidence from Municipal By-Elections in South Africa
Location
B6, 30-32 - Room 310
Date
start: 26.11.2018 - 14:00 Uhr
end: 26.11.2018 - 15:00 Uhr

Speaker:
Dr. Joachim Wehner - LSE (London School of Economics)
Abstract:
Theories of retrospective accountability assume that voters punish poor governance and reward improvements, yet empirical evidence remains mixed. We extend this research to a new context, assessing the impact of audit information on electoral performance in South African municipalities. Our novel identification strategy focuses on by-elections triggered by deaths in office of local councilors and compares those taking place before and after audit results are announced each year. We find that timely audit information affects the vote share of the responsible party, with voters rewarding improvements and punishing poor performance by about 5 percentage points. This broadens the scope conditions of prior work by documenting accountability effects in a party-centered setting. We argue that to reconcile seemingly disparate results in this area requires recognizing the importance of information disseminated at full scale – which activates regular transmission channels, increases salience, and ensures common knowledge – and from a credible source.

Monday
03.12.2018
14:00 Uhr
SFB Seminar SeriesPublic
tba
Location
B6, 30-32 - Room 310
Date
start: 03.12.2018 - 14:00 Uhr
end: 03.12.2018 - 15:00 Uhr

Speaker:
Dimitrios Xefteris - University of Cyprus
Abstract:
tba

Monday
10.12.2018
14:00 Uhr
SFB Seminar SeriesPublic
tba
Location
B6, 30-32 - Room 310
Date
start: 10.12.2018 - 14:00 Uhr
end: 10.12.2018 - 15:00 Uhr

Speaker:
Jorg Spenkuch - Kellogg School of Management, Northwestern University
Abstract:
tba

Tuesday
11.12.2018
14:00 Uhr
Seminar SeriesPublic
tba
Location
B6, 30-32 - Room 310
Date
start: 11.12.2018 - 14:00 Uhr
end: 11.12.2018 - 15:00 Uhr

Speaker:
Valentin Gold - Georg-August-Universität Göttingen
Abstract:
tba